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1. Introduction.  
Coordination failure often causes organizations to get stuck in situations that are 
unsatisfactory for all involved. The question then is how to extricate people from such 
performance traps and bring about change for the better.  Coordination has long been studied 
by behavioral game theorists,1 but typically the only players in the game are the agents 
attempting to coordinate.  In many settings, there are important external agents who have a 
stake in whether coordination is achieved.  If a firm earns low profits because of coordination 
failure among its employees, the management and shareholders suffer as well.  If a country 
fails to develop economically because of coordination failure among industries, the 
government has a serious problem.  It follows that these external agents have strong 
incentives to take actions that will lead to improved coordination.  In this paper we study the 
role of external agents with a stake in the outcome, specifically managers of underperforming 
corporations, in moving organizations from coordination failure to successful coordination. 
Our work focuses on the effectiveness of two prominent management tools used to 
influence behavior in such situations, financial incentives and communication. We study 
experiments set in a corporate environment, called the “turnaround game,” where managers’ 
and employees’ payoffs depend positively on employees coordinating at high effort levels – 
the underlying game being played by employees is a weak-link game.  In an initial phase, 
where managerial intervention is absent, employees almost invariably slip into coordination 
failure. An additional subject is then introduced as a manager.  This manager, faced with 
overcoming a history of coordination failure, can take action in two ways. First, he can 
change employees’ incentives to coordinate by shifting some portion of the organization’s 
surplus over to employees.  From an economists’ point of view this is an obvious tool to use.  
Second, he can communicate with employees. Although this may seem less natural to 
economists, studies in organizational behavior suggest that communication is one of the 
crucial variables that influence change.2  Indeed, there is good reason to believe that 
communication will be particularly effective in organizations afflicted by coordination failure 
as this is primarily a problem of beliefs.  The weak-link game being played by employees is 
fairly simple and presumably after a few periods most subjects realize that mutual gains 
would occur if all employees switched to higher effort levels.  However, no one employee 
can affect a positive change unilaterally.  To be willing to choose a higher effort level, an 
                                                          
1 See Camerer (2003, ch. 7) for a recent summary of this literature. 
2 For examples see Ford and Ford (1995) and Kotter (1996). 
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employee must believe that others will also choose to increase their effort levels.  In the face 
of a history of coordination failure such beliefs are understandably difficult to achieve.  A 
manager’s task therefore fundamentally consists of finding a way to affect employees’ beliefs 
about other employees’ actions.  The effective use of communication is a way of influencing 
employees’ beliefs in a positive way. The ability to do this can be seen as an essential feature 
of leadership, one of the components of vision, as discussed in Foss (2001).  
Our experimental design systematically varies the avenues of communication 
available to managers and employees.  In our baseline treatment, managers only control 
financial incentives and no communication is possible.  We then allow for one-way 
communication – managers can send messages to employees – and two-way communication 
– managers can send messages to employees and vice versa.  The content of communication 
between managers and employees was completely unstructured as subjects could send any 
messages they desired subject only to minor restrictions. We recorded all of the messages and 
quantified the content using a systematic coding scheme.  Analyzing these codings allows us 
to compare the impact of various types of messages with the impact of changing financial 
incentives, identify the most successful type of messages, and generally characterize most 
effective managerial communication style. 
Our results emphasize the importance of communication.  As the available avenues of 
communication increase, both employees’ effort and managers’ profits increase.  
Communication is a more effective tool for increasing manager profits than financial 
incentives.  The marginal profit from increasing incentives is actually slightly negative, as 
increased payments to employees more than consume the added revenue from increased 
effort by employees.  In contrast, the most effective types of messages increase profits by 
over 30% on average.  This is the central result of our paper – for managers attempting to 
overcome a history of coordination failure, it’s what you say, not what you pay, that largely 
determines your success. 
While managers try a wide variety of communication strategies, including complex 
multi-round plans, the most successful communication strategy is quite simple: Explicitly 
request that all employees choose a high effort level, emphasize the mutual benefits of 
coordinating at a high effort level, and assure the employees that they are being paid well 
(although it is not necessary to actually pay them well).  In other words, managers succeed in 
this environment by acting as good coordination devices.   
Successful communication from employees to managers takes a surprising form – the 
most valuable thing an employee can do is give advice to the manager on how he should 
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approach the other employees.  Because employees benefit from having the manager 
successfully coordinate their effort levels, they have strong incentives to offer useful advice.  
Managers in the two-way communication treatment therefore enjoy the benefits of group 
decision making.3 
Two secondary results of our analysis are worth noting.  First, sessions for these 
experiments were conducted at two locations, Case Western Reserve in Cleveland and 
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona in Barcelona.  Barcelona managers perform significantly 
worse than Cleveland managers.  This poor performance occurs primarily in sessions where 
managers can communicate with employees and reflects underlying differences in the types 
of messages sent by managers in the two locations.  This result does not necessarily reflect 
cultural differences, as the two populations differ on a number of dimensions, but 
demonstrates how performance can vary between populations because of systematic 
differences in managerial communication strategies. 
Second, we checked whether, controlling for differences in financial incentives, 
employees managed by a computer did worse than employees managed by another human 
absent any possibility of communication.  We find no significant differences, giving us added 
confidence in the results of earlier studies where the manager is computer-controlled. 
The work most closely related to that reported here is Capra, Tanaka, Camerer, 
Munyan, Sovero, Wang, and Noussair (2005).4  Their experiment studies coordination failure 
in a growth model drawn from the development literature.  They find that allowing 
communication among players leads (on average) to improved coordination.  Our work 
differs from their simultaneous and independent contribution in many ways, three of which 
deserve mention.  First, our work focuses on change.  Our experimental design generates a 
history of coordination failure which a new manager and the employees then need to 
overcome.  Second, our game includes an agent, the manager, who does not actually play the 
coordination game but has a direct stake in its outcome.  In Capra et al, all communication is 
                                                          
3 For summaries of the psychology literature on group decision making see Davis (1992) and Kerr, MacCoun, 
and Kramer (1996).  For logic problems with a demonstrably correct solution, groups generally perform better 
than individuals although not as well as a group of individuals operating independently would do. 
4 Chaudhuri, Schotter, and Sopher (2004) also study experiments where an external agent has an interest in 
coordination.  In their case, a participant in a previous minimum game can offer advice to a “successor” in the 
current minimum game.  The ancestor receives a payoff identical to the successor’s earnings in the current 
minimum game as well as their earnings from their previous play.  Chaudhuri et al find that advice increases 
coordination if it is common knowledge and of sufficient quality.  See also Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe, and Ross 
(1989 and 1992) and Weber, Camerer, Rottenstreich, and Knez (2001).  These papers are less relevant to our 
work due to their use of either restricted message spaces or suggested scripts.    For the effect of cheap talk in 
experiments in general see Crawford (1998). 
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between the agents playing the coordination game.  We do not allow any communication 
between employees so as to focus on the interaction between managers and employees.  
Finally and most importantly, instead of concentrating solely on communication, we examine 
both incentives and communication with a focus on which tool is most effective for 
overcoming coordination failure.  The rich communication strategies we observe are largely 
due to the interaction between incentives and communication as well as the inherent tension 
between managers and employees.  We view the work of Capra et al as a complement to our 
own, driving home the point that communication can play an important role in overcoming 
coordination failure, but it does not address the interactions between managers and 
employees that drive our most interesting results. 
Section 2 introduces the turnaround game.  Section 3 describes our experimental 
design and summarizes the primary research questions arising from our design.  Section 4 
presents our procedures.  Section 5 reports the results and Section 6 concludes.   
2. The Corporate Turnaround Game 
An experimental firm in the corporate turnaround game consists of four employees 
and a manager.  The structure of the game played by these five subjects is governed by the 
following pair of basic design choices.  
1) The firm’s technology has a weak-link structure. 
As described by Kremer (1993), for many organizations the individual (or unit) doing 
the worst job – the “weak link” – determines the overall productivity of an organization.  
Applied to the corporate turnaround game, this assumption implies that productivity (and 
profitability) depends on the minimum effort level chosen by the four employees.  As a 
prototypical example, imagine a firm producing via an assembly line where the slowest 
worker determines the speed of the entire line.5 
Starting from this observation, Knez and Camerer (1994) argue that the game played 
within many firms takes on the form of the “minimum game” introduced by Van Huyck, 
Battalio, and Beil (1990).  Knez and Camerer refer to these games by the more evocative 
term “weak-link games,” a terminology that we follow.  These are a type of coordination 
game.  Each player simultaneously chooses a strategy that can be thought of as an effort 
level.  A player’s payoff is a decreasing function of his own effort and an increasing function 
of the minimum effort chosen by the players in the group.  Payoffs are set up so that it is 
worthwhile for a player to raise his effort level if and only if it will increase the minimum 
                                                          
5 For examples from field settings, see Knez and Simester’s (2002) study of Continental Airline’s turnaround 
and Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi’s (1997) work on steel production. 
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effort for the group.  Coordinating on any of the available effort levels is a Nash equilibrium 
for a weak-link game, but results from earlier experiments suggest that play often evolves 
towards the payoff dominated equilibrium where all players choose the lowest possible effort 
level.6  In the corporate turnaround game, the subgame following the manager’s choice of an 
incentive scheme will always be a weak-link game. 
By studying a production technology with a weak-link structure, we focus on a worst-
case scenario.  Presumably many organizations face coordination problems in more forgiving 
settings where a change for the better is easily achieved.  However, if we can understand how 
to overcome coordination failure in organizations with a weak-link structure, a tough 
environment, it should be even easier to accomplish in less difficult circumstances. 
2) Both managers and employees get limited information feedback.  
Specifically, we assume the firm manager observes the minimum effort selected 
(which is revealed by the firm’s productivity), but cannot observe any individual employee’s 
effort level.  Likewise, employees observe their own effort and the minimum effort for the 
firm, but not the individual efforts of the other three employees.  For the managers this 
implies that they lack the necessary information to tailor bonuses to the effort put forth by 
individuals and can only offer bonuses based on the minimum effort over all employees.  In 
other words, limiting the information available to the firm manager restricts the tools 
available for overcoming coordination failure. Limiting employees’ information gives 
managers a significantly more difficult task, as previous work demonstrates that overcoming 
coordination failure is substantially more difficult when employees cannot observe others’ 
effort levels.7  
Limiting the manager’s information about employees’ choices implies that he, 
consistent with the spirit of most principal-agent models, has difficulty monitoring them.  
There is no particular reason to believe that this assumption has either more or less external 
validity than assuming the manager individually monitors the employees, as both cases occur 
in reality.  The benefit of limiting the manager’s information is a considerable simplification 
of the environment as well as confronting the manager with a more challenging task.   
We limit the employees’ information feedback for three reasons. The first is that with 
full feedback there is asymmetric information between the manager and the employees.  This 
                                                          
6 See Van Huyck et al (1990) and Knez and Camerer (1994 and 2000).  Coordination failure is less likely in 
small groups – see preceding as well as Weber, Camerer and Knez (2004). 
7 See Brandts and Cooper (2004).  
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introduces extraneous issues that add unwanted complexity to our design. Second, we want to 
make the manager’s task harder in overcoming coordination failure.  As a general design 
feature we try to confront managers with a difficult but not impossible task.8 Presumably 
lessons learned from such a harsh environment will be valuable in more forgiving settings as 
well.  Finally, limiting the employees’ information accentuates the importance of leadership 
by the manager.  When employees can see the choices of other employees, leading by 
example often takes place.9  One or more employees make a large increase in their effort 
levels presumably in the hope of leading laggards to match this effort, thereby overturning a 
history of coordination failure.  This sort of internal leadership works reasonably well with 
full feedback, but can’t work with limited feedback as laggards can’t see the effort choices of 
putative leaders.  Limited feedback therefore leaves managers as the primary source of 
potential leadership within the firm. 
Turning to the specifics of the turnaround game, a round of the game starts with the 
manager setting a bonus rate (B) that determines how much additional pay each employee 
receives per unit increase in the minimum effort.  Bonuses are based solely on the minimum 
effort, consistent with our assumption that the manager cannot observe individual efforts.  
We restrict the feasible bonus rates to the integers B 0 {6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15}.  Given 
the other parameter values used in our experiments, this is the set of (integer) bonus rates that 
neither make the choice of positive effort a dominated strategy nor allow the manager to lose 
money.  The employees observe B and simultaneously select effort levels.  Intuitively, 
employees spend forty hours per week on the job, and effort measures the number of these 
hours that they actually work hard rather than loafing.  Employee i's effort, Ei, is restricted to 
be in ten hour increments: Ei 0 {0,10, 20, 30, 40}.    The players’ payoffs are then given by 
the following payoff functions: 
Manager payoff:  { } ( )F ii 1,2,3,4π 100 (60 4B) min E∈⎛ ⎞= + − ×⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  (eq. 1) 
Employee i payoff:  { } ( )ie i jj 1,2,3,4π 200 5E B min E∈⎛ ⎞= − + ×⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  (eq. 2) 
                                                          
8 On a related point, we use four employees rather than either a smaller or larger number to make it possible but 
not trivial to overcome a history of coordination failure.  Based on the results of Van Huyck et al (1990), it 
would likely be a simple task to overcome coordination failure with only two employees (if it even occurred to 
begin with).  Likewise, turning around a very large group would likely be so difficult that we would learn 
nothing from the exercise. 
9 See Brandts and Cooper (2005). 
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The manager’s payoff depends on the minimum effort selected by his employees, 
consistent with our assumption that the firm’s production technology has the weak-link 
property.  As can be seen in Equations 1 and 2, the bonus transfers a portion of the firm’s 
revenues to its employees.  Managers are limited to a linear bonus scheme to simplify the 
game.  
To develop the basic theoretical properties of the turnaround game, we first focus on 
the proper subgame where employees choose effort levels after the manager has chosen a 
bonus rate.  For all available values of the bonus rate the resulting subgame is a weak-link 
game.  Coordinating on any of the five available effort levels is a Nash equilibrium.  Given 
this multiplicity of equilibria in the subgame, subgame perfection has little predictive power 
for the full game.  In particular, any combination of bonus rate and minimum effort can be 
supported by a subgame perfect equilibrium. 
To understand why overcoming coordination failure is so difficult in this 
environment, consider the game induced by a bonus value of B = 6 (see top panel of Table 1).  
Suppose that the employees have previously all chosen effort level 0.  An employee who 
thinks about raising his effort from 0 to 10 faces a certain payoff reduction of 50 pesetas due 
to increased effort, while his maximum possible gain is only 10 pesetas beyond the 200 
pesetas he gets without risk by choosing 0.  For the proposed increase to have a positive 
expected profit, the employee must believe the probability of the three other employees 
simultaneously raising their efforts from 0 to 10 equals at least 5/6.  Treating the other three 
employees as statistically independent, this translates into requiring a 94% chance of 
increased effort for each of the other three employees.10  Given these grim incentives, 
overcoming coordination failure is quite unlikely with a low bonus rate. 
(Insert Table 1 Here) 
 Now imagine that a new manager takes over the firm.  Determined to shake the firm 
out of its underperforming ways, he raises the bonus rate to B = 14, the highest bonus rate at 
which the firm manager can earn a profit.  This yields the payoff table shown in the bottom 
panel of Table 1. The incentives for employees to increase effort are strengthened by this 
change. Again suppose we start with all four employees choosing effort level 0.  An 
employee increasing his effort from 0 to 10 still faces a certain loss of 50 pesetas, but the 
potential gain is now 90 pesetas.  The break-even probability that the other employees will 
simultaneously increase their efforts is now 5/14.  Assuming the other three employees are 
                                                          
10 To derive this probability, solve for p such that 200 = 150*(1-p3) + 210*p3. 
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independent, this translates into requiring a 71% chance that each employee raises his effort.  
These are better odds than we saw with B = 6, but still daunting.  Although one can imagine 
employees now at least attempting to overcome coordination failure, there is clearly room for 
the manager to play a leadership role beyond increasing the bonus rate. 
3.  Experimental Design 
To understand the experimental design, it is necessary to realize that our focus is not 
on comparative static results.  It is quite possible that subjects with no previous experience 
will generally converge to a more efficient equilibrium in the turnaround game with B = 14 
than in the game with B = 6. This, however, isn’t our point.  Instead, we want to know if and 
how managers will overcome a history of coordination failure.  The experiments are therefore 
designed so that employees will usually fail to coordinate prior to the possibility of 
managerial interventions. 
At the beginning of a session, subjects were randomly assigned to either the role of an 
employee or a manager.  Subjects then played thirty rounds of the turnaround game in fixed 
groups (“firms”) of five: one manager and four employees. For the first ten rounds of the 
experiment the manager was strictly an observer; managers could see the same round by 
round information feedback that they normally received, but could neither control the bonus 
rate nor communicate with employees.  Managers were not paid for these rounds, although 
employees and managers were both shown the payoffs that the manager would have earned.  
The bonus rate was fixed at B = 6 for the first ten rounds, this being the lowest (integer) 
bonus rate that does not make choosing positive effort levels a dominated strategy.  The goal 
was to get a high percentage of firms coordinated on the inefficient outcome with minimum 
effort equal to zero.  This seemed likely given the results of previous experiments (Brandts 
and Cooper, 2004 and 2005). 
For the remaining twenty rounds the manager actively managed his firm.  The 
employees were informed when the manager took over control of the firm.  In all treatments 
the manager was then responsible for choosing a bonus rate in each round and received 
payoffs as shown in Equation 1.   
(Insert Table 2 Here) 
Table 2 summarizes the treatments in our experimental design.  The primary 
treatment variable in our sessions is what type of communication was possible between a 
firm’s manager and employees. The three communication conditions we studied are: 
• No Communication. 
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• One Way Communication. At the same time that firm managers selected a bonus 
rate they were given a text box that could be used to type a message to their 
employees.  These messages were shown to the employees, along with the bonus 
rate, prior to the employees choosing effort levels. The messages were cheap talk 
as any commitments made in the communication stage were non-binding. 
• Two Way Communication. Managers could send messages as above. Employees 
were given a similar text box to send a message to the manager at the same time 
as they chose an effort level. These messages were sent only to the manager, not 
to the other employees. As above, messages were cheap talk. 
As a secondary treatment, we also report results from sessions where the firm 
manager was played by the computer with bonus levels determined exogenously for all 
rounds.  This treatment is a control for whether using a subject as the manager as opposed to 
the computer affects employees’ choices independent of financial incentives, an important 
methodological issue if the current study is to be compared with earlier work using a 
computer as the manager (e.g. Brandts and Cooper, 2004 and 2005).   Employees in these 
sessions knew that the manager was always the computer rather than another subject.  For 
these sessions the bonus rate equaled 6 for the first ten rounds and 10 for the remaining 20 
rounds, similar to the average bonus level chosen in the sessions with human managers. 
 Our subjects were undergraduate students from Case Western Reserve University in 
Cleveland and from either Universitat Pompeu Fabra or the Universitat Autònoma in 
Barcelona.11  While the use of two populations was not intended as a treatment per se, there 
are a number of differences in behavior between the two locations that will be described in 
the results section.  Because of a related project using EMBAs as subjects, we needed to run 
most of the one-way communication sessions in Cleveland. We therefore made no attempt to 
balance the sessions between the two locations, instead relying on statistical analysis to 
control for location effects. We ran at least 5 experimental firms for each treatment in each 
location. We believe this is sufficient to statistically identify any location effects. We ran at 
least 20 experimental firms for each of the treatments with human managers. 
 Our experimental design is intended to address five specific research questions; in the 
results section we will present five corresponding regularities.  
                                                          
11 Barcelona sessions with computer managers were run at UPF and all other Barcelona sessions were run at 
UAB.  There is little difference between the student bodies at the two universities. 
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QUESTION 1: In the absence of communication and holding the bonus rate fixed, will 
minimum effort be significantly different with human managers than with computer 
managers? 
 From a purely economic point view, we might predict that, absent communication, the 
level of the bonus is the primary force driving employees’ effort levels regardless of whether 
it is set by man or machine. However if play with human managers taps into emotions that 
aren’t present with computer managers, then effort levels are likely to depend on whether the 
manager is a fellow subject.12   
 
QUESTION 2: Will more avenues of communication lead to higher minimum effort holding 
financial incentives fixed? Specifically, will average minimum effort be greater with one way 
communication than with no communication (and human managers)?  Will average minimum 
effort be greater with two way communication than with one way communication? 
 
QUESTION 3: Ceteris paribus, will increased financial incentives (e.g. higher values of B) 
lead to higher minimum effort?  
 
QUESTION 4:  Which communication strategies will be most effective in increasing the 
minimum effort? 
 
QUESTION 5: Will firm managers’ choices of financial incentives be more important in 
determining their profits than their choice of communication strategies? 
 
Questions 2 – 5 cut to the heart of the matter.  Based on the literature studying change 
from organizational behavior, our prior was that more avenues of communication will 
effectively lead to better coordination.13  Standard economists’ intuition suggested that the 
answer to Question 3 would to be positive as well, although results from our earlier study 
with computer managers (Brandts and Cooper, 2005) suggest otherwise.  We had no strong 
prior about the answers for Questions 4 and 5, as these truly explore terra incognita. 
4. Procedures. 
 All sessions were run on a computerized network. Sessions with subjects as firm 
managers were run using a web application specifically developed for this purpose while the 
sessions with computer managers used a z-tree program. There are minor differences in how 
                                                          
12 There exists a large literature on experimental labor markets demonstrating a positive relationship between 
wages and effort.  This bilateral gift exchange is presumably due to reciprocity, as employees reward a higher 
wage with greater effort. For a survey of these results, see Fehr and Falk (2002).  Note that the environment 
being studied in this literature is quite different from that studied here, as there is typically only one employee 
and effort is a strictly dominated strategy.  The focus is on issues of trust and trustworthiness rather than 
coordination as is the case here. 
13 In experiments studying battle-of-the sexes coordination games, one-way communication has been found to 
be more effective at accomplishing good coordination than two-communication (Cooper et al, 1989). However, 
the asymmetry of equilibrium payoffs in that case implies a fundamentally different situation. 
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information is presented between the programs (e.g. the screens are laid out in a slightly 
different fashion).  
 Instructions were framed in neutral but naturalistic terms. Subjects received 
instructions and payoff quiz questions for both roles. Subjects were told that in the role of 
employees they must allocate 40 hours a week, in ten hour blocks, between Task A and Task 
B.  Task A is equivalent to effort, but this term, due to its strong connotations, was never used 
when communicating with subjects through the instructions or otherwise.  Subjects knew the 
number of rounds in the experiments and knew in advance when the bonus would be set by 
the computer and when it would be set by another subject acting as manager.  Subjects were 
reminded of this information throughout the course of the experiment.   
In the one and two-way communication treatments managers were given – at the same 
time that they were asked to choose a bonus level - a text box in which they could type a 
message. Subjects were given no instructions about the content of the messages except that 
they could not identify themselves or use offensive language.  Although we did not monitor 
messages in real time, our ex post reading of them indicates that subjects universally abided 
by these restrictions.  Subjects were given no time or length limit on entering messages.  
Indeed, some of the messages were quite long and took a lengthy time to type. Once the 
manager was finished, whatever message he wrote was sent to all the employees in the firm 
at the same time they saw his choice for the bonus rate. 
In the two-way communication treatment employee communication came into play. 
At the same time that employees were asked to choose an effort level, they were given a text 
box in which they could type a message. Their instructions about messages were identical to 
those given to managers. Employees’ messages were sent to their manager, appearing at the 
same time the manager saw the minimum effort chosen by their employees in the previous 
round.  Employees could not send messages among themselves.  The manager could not 
identify which employee was specifically responsible for a particular message as messages 
were randomly ordered and displayed without any identifying information.   
 Payoffs were converted from ‘experimental pesetas’ to dollars/euros at a 500:1 ratio. 
Average payoffs were $24.37 in Cleveland and 16.59€ in Barcelona.  Much of this difference 
come from the need for a larger show-up fee in Cleveland ($10) to attract subjects than in 
Barcelona (5€).  Given that the average exchange rate during the period experiments were 
being run was about $1.15/1€, the marginal cost of effort and the marginal benefit of 
increasing minimum effort was somewhat higher in Barcelona. 
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 To limit the possibility of contamination across sessions, as part of subjects’ post-
experiment instructions we strongly encouraged subjects to not discuss the specifics of the 
experiment with others.  In a post-experimental survey we asked subjects if any previous 
participant had discussed the details of the experiment with them.  The lack of positive 
responses indicates that the vast majority of subjects complied with our request to not share 
their experiences.  Data from the one firm where the manager had talked with an earlier 
participant about how to play the game has been excluded from our analysis. 
 Sessions for this experiment typically only lasted about ninety minutes, but there were 
a small number of firms that ran for a longer period of time.  These relatively long sessions 
were caused by a combination of particularly verbose subjects and slow network connections.   
Due to other groups having reservations for the rooms where experiments were being run, 
these firms had to end play prior to the completion of all thirty rounds – an announcement 
was made at the beginning of the last round that the experiment would be ending 
prematurely.  The statistical analysis in our results section includes controls for firms that 
ended play prior to the completion of thirty rounds.     
 For one session with one-way communication, containing four firms, the messages 
were accidentally not saved.  The software worked correctly for this session, so all the data 
on subjects’ choices that was saved has been included in our dataset, but obviously data from 
this session is not reflected in any content analysis of managers’ messages.  
5. Results 
 Before getting into the data, it is useful to reiterate our terminology.  A “firm” refers 
to a fixed grouping of four employees and a manager.  “Firm-level” data consists of a single 
observation per round per firm, the minimum effort chosen by the four employees of the firm.  
Throughout this paper, unless otherwise specified, we are using firm-level data. 
A.  Treatment Effects:  For our treatments to be interesting, it is necessary that a history of 
coordination failure be established in the first ten rounds.  The data clearly meets this pre-
condition.  The average minimum effort falls from 7.09 in round 1 to a paltry 2.37 in round 
10.  The minimum effort is zero in round 10 for 77 out of a total of 86 firms.   When human 
managers took over in round 11, the need for a turnaround is almost always present.   
Table 3 presents an overview of bonuses, minimum efforts, and payoffs for rounds 11 
– 30 of the different treatments. This information provides a first impression of the answers to 
Questions 1 and 2.  Note that the average bonus level is similar across treatments, suggesting 
that any treatment differences will not be due to differences in incentives.  
(Insert Table 3) 
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The fact that the average minimum effort is higher for the computer manager 
treatment than the no communication treatment (11.8 vs. 4.2) suggests that the answer to 
Question 1 is positive. However, these averages are misleading as differences between these 
two treatments are largely driven by random differences in minimum efforts for round 10. 
This point can be seen clearly by comparing Figures 1 and 2.  Figure 1 shows the evolution of 
average minimum effort for the four main treatments, using the data from all firms, while 
Figure 2 only includes those experimental firms for which coordination failure occurred in 
round 10 (e.g. minimum effort equals 0 in round 10).   The latter are the most pertinent data, 
since those few groups that do not fall into coordination failure fail to satisfy the precondition 
for our study of turnaround.  In Figure 1 we see that average minimum effort for the 
computer manager treatment is consistently greater than in the no communication treatment 
and is almost identical to average minimum effort in the one-way communication treatment.  
However, consider the data from round 10 (shown at the left of Figure 1).  By chance, the 
average minimum effort in round 10 is higher for the computer manager treatment than for 
any other treatment while the average minimum effort in round 10 for the no communication 
treatment is the lowest of all four treatments.  In Figure 2, where the playing field is leveled 
by only considering firms that start from a history of coordination failure, the difference 
between the computer manager and no communication treatments is far less dramatic.  
(Insert Figures 1 and 2) 
REGULARITY 1:  Controlling for the average minimum effort in round 10, there is little 
difference between the average minimum efforts in rounds 11 – 30 for the computer manager 
and no communication treatments. 
Returning to Table 3, a comparison of the summary data shown for the three 
treatments with human managers indicates that we can answer Question 2 affirmatively – 
additional avenues for communication lead to higher effort levels (holding bonus rates 
approximately constant).  Consistent with the higher average minimum efforts, greater 
possibilities for communication lead to higher earnings for both managers and employees.  
Comparing Figures 1 and 2, this conclusion holds even if our attention is limited to 
only those firms that start from a history of coordination failure.  Looking at Figure 2, note 
how much larger the difference is between the one and two way communication treatments 
than between one way communication and no communication. 
REGULARITY 2: Increased avenues of communication lead to higher minimum effort and 
higher payoffs for all parties holding financial incentives fixed. 
To put the preceding discussion on a firmer statistical footing, Table 4 presents the 
results of regressions on firms’ minimum efforts in rounds 11 – 30.  To be precise, the 
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dependent variable is a firm’s average minimum effort between round 11 and the firm’s final 
round of play.  Note that each firm appears as a single observation in the data set.  There are 
22 firms that had a minimum effort of 0 in all relevant rounds.  To correct for the left 
censored data that results, we use a tobit specification.  The results of these regressions need 
to be interpreted with care.  While most of the critical variables, such as the treatment 
dummies, are clearly exogenous, others, such as the average bonus rate, are not.  For the 
endogenous variables we are capturing correlations with the average minimum effort but 
causation should not be inferred from these correlations.   
(Insert Table 4) 
 The base in these regressions is data from the computer manager treatment.  
Exogenous variables include a dummy for all the treatments in which the manager was a 
subject, a dummy for the two treatments with communication, and a dummy for the two-way 
communication treatment.  The first of these three dummies captures the difference between 
the computer manager and no communication treatments, the second measures the difference 
between the no communication and one-way communication treatments, and the final dummy 
quantifies the difference between the one and two way communication treatments.  A dummy 
for data gathered in Barcelona controls for location effects.  To control for firms’ differing 
initial conditions, both regressions include the minimum effort in round 10 as an exogenous 
variable.  Model 2 adds three control variables to sharpen the results from Model 1.  The 
average bonus level is a natural control for the pure effect of incentives, although this is the 
right hand side variable that is most clearly endogenous.  We expect this endogeneity to bias 
the parameter estimate upwards, as managers tend to respond to high effort levels with higher 
bonus rates.  We also include a specific control for the bonus rate in round 11.  As can be 
seen in Figure 3, the bonus rate rises more rapidly in the computer manager treatment than in 
any of the treatments with human managers.  If employees are more sensitive to the initial 
changes in the bonus rate than changes in later rounds, then the higher effort levels in the 
computer manager treatment may be due in part to differences in the bonus rate for round 11.  
The bonus rate in round 11 is exogenous as it is determined before any of the relevant effort 
decisions are made.  The variable “number of rounds completed” was included to account for 
the fact that five firms did not complete the 30 rounds.  Arguably, this variable is endogenous 
as it relates the communication styles of managers and employees.   
(Insert Figure 3) 
The results for Models 1 and 2 are similar.  Consistent with Figure 2, there is no 
significant difference between the computer manager sessions and the no communication 
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sessions once differences in round 10 minimum efforts are controlled for.  This result 
confirms Regularity 1.  The parameter estimates for both the communication and two-way 
communication dummies are positive and significant in both Model 1 and Model 2.  The 
effect of adding two-way communication is particularly strong judging by either the 
magnitude of the estimates or their statistical significance.  Regularity 2 is also confirmed by 
the tobit analysis. 
Models 1 and 2 also allow us to draw some initial conclusions about the impact of 
incentives.  The average bonus is not significant, a surprising result given the upwards bias 
we expect in this estimate.  In contrast, the bonus rate for round 11 has a significant positive 
effect on average minimum efforts.  Apparently first impressions matter.14  Inclusion of the 
bonus rate for round 11 is responsible for the reduced parameter estimate for “Human 
managers” in Model 2.   
An unexpected feature of our data is that minimum efforts are systematically lower in 
Barcelona.  Examining Table 3 we see a difference for all treatments, although the location 
effect is much stronger in treatments with communication.  The regression results are 
consistent with these observations.  For both Models 1 and 2 on Table 4, the Barcelona 
dummy is negative and statistically significant.  In additional tobit regressions beyond those 
reported on Table 4, we have interacted the Barcelona dummy with dummies for whether or 
not communication was present.  The Barcelona effect is negative in both cases, but is much 
larger with communication and only is statistically significant in this case.15  This result 
would make one suspect that the location effect must be tied to differences between the two 
populations in communication strategies.  Our content analysis of the messages will confirm 
this conjecture. 
B.  The Content of Messages:  At this point we know that communication and successful 
coordination go together.  We also know that the poor performance of firms in Barcelona is 
linked to communication.  This brings us to the heart of the matter: what kinds of statements 
                                                          
14 This sensitivity is restricted to the very first period with a manager.  If we include the bonus rate for round 12 
in an analogous regression, for example, it has no statistically significant effect. 
15 The simplest of these models modifies Model 1 from Table 4 by interacting the Barcelona dummy with 
dummies for communication (pooling the one way and two way communication treatments) or the lack thereof 
(pooling the no communication and computer manager treatments).  The parameter estimate for the interaction 
with communication is -12.80 with a standard error of 3.80, yielding statistical significance at the 1% level.  For 
the other interaction term, the parameter estimate is -1.06 with standard error of 4.02, far from statistical 
significance.  The location effect is only significant in firms where some sort of communication is possible.  
More complex models yield the same conclusion. 
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are linked to high effort levels and how does the impact of these statements compare with that 
of financial incentives?  
 To answer these questions, some way of quantifying the content of message is 
necessary.  We therefore have developed and implemented a systematic scheme for coding 
the content of messages.  The goal was to systematically quantify any communication that 
might be relevant to play of the game.  We tried as much as possible to avoid pre-judging 
which sorts of messages would be important and which would not.  Our methods are largely 
identical to those employed by Cooper and Kagel (2004).  We began by randomly selecting 
ten firms to serve as a test sample, five from the one-way communication treatment and five 
from the two-way communication treatment.  Both co-authors as well as two research 
assistants independently developed their own coding schemes for the test sample.  In a series 
of meetings we reconciled these individual efforts into a single coding scheme.  Three 
research assistants then independently coded all messages sent by managers or employees. 
One bilingual RA (native language English) coded all messages. An American RA coded all 
Cleveland messages and a Spanish RA coded all Barcelona messages.  No effort was made to 
force agreement among coders – the goal was to have two independent readings of each 
message so that any coding errors were uncorrelated.  At no point in the process of 
developing or implementing the coding scheme was any RA informed about any hypotheses 
the co-authors had about the messages.  The RAs were repeatedly and explicitly told that 
their job was to capture what had been said rather than why it was said or what effect it had.  
Coding was binary – a message was coded as a 1 if was deemed to contain the relevant 
category of content and zero otherwise.  We had no requirement on the number of codings for 
a message – a coder could check as many or few categories as he or she deemed appropriate.  
A number of the categories have sub-categories.  For example, Category 1 for managers is 
“Ask for Effort.”  Under this are three sub-categories, “Polite,” “Rude,” and “Specific effort 
level.”  A coder was free to check as many or few sub-categories as they desired when a 
category was checked off.16 
Our analysis of the codings uses averages across coders otherwise noted.  In 
averaging across coders, we are implicitly assuming that errors are independent across coders 
so that averaging reduces the total error. Cross-coder correlations for major categories were 
generally around .6, slightly better than in the results reported in Cooper and Kagel (2004).  
(Insert Tables 5 and 6) 
                                                          
16 A sub-category could not be coded without coding the corresponding category.  We didn’t instruct the coders 
to not check mutually exclusive sub-categories like “Polite” and “Rude,” although they never did so. 
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Table 5 summarizes the codings of managers’ messages and Table 6 provides 
analogous information for employees’ messages.17  To provide ourselves with a manageable 
problem we concentrate on the effects of the most frequent codes - those that appear in at 
least 7.5% of all available observations.18  We generally do not include sub-categories even 
though several clear this threshold to avoid problems with co-linearity in the regressions. 
For a number of the common categories, the brief descriptions in Tables 5 and 6 don’t 
adequately characterize the nature of the messages.  We therefore begin by better describing 
some key categories along with examples.  Starting with the managers, category 1 codes any 
request that employees choose a higher effort level.  For example, “Please spend more hours 
on Activity A [effort]. Please.”  The frequent requests for a specific effort level were also 
coded under sub-category 1c.   
Category 4 codes messages that point out the benefits of choosing higher effort levels 
for the employees – frequently this involved explicit discussion of the possibility for mutual 
gains by managers and employees (sub-category 4c).  The following quote is a typical 
example: “We would all make more money if you, as employees, devoted your time to 
activity A [effort].”   
Categories 5 and 6 are similar but not identical.  Messages coded under category 5 
involved the manager offering an implicit short term contract.  A common form of these 
implicit contracts was the promise of an increased bonus rate in the next round if the 
employees delivered the some requested minimum effort in the current round (coded as sub-
category 5a).  As an example, “I'll set the bonus high next time if we all do 40 this time.”  
Category 6 was reserved for longer term plans, often lacking the explicit quid pro quo of the 
implicit contracts coded under category 5.  Many times these plans involved employees 
choosing a high effort in all rounds while the manager alternated between setting a high 
bonus rate and a low bonus rate.  The following is a simple example of this sort of plan: “I 
think the best way for everyone to get a lot of money is to all go 40 hours every time and 
alternate between a 7 and 14 every other time.”  As in the preceding quote, alternating plans 
were often presented, either explicitly or implicitly, as a way to even out payoffs between the 
employees and manager.  While this could have been accomplished just as well by picking an 
                                                          
17 Coding frequencies for the one-way treatment do not include the four firms for which the messages were 
accidentally lost. 
18 All of the analysis reported here has also been done with a cut-off of 5% for inclusion.  This has little impact 
on our conclusions as the added categories have little effect on behavior. 
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intermediate bonus rate, there seems to be a preference for alternating, perhaps because it 
makes the gift exchange clearer.   
Category 10 was coded when the manager emphasized the bonus, usually by 
explicitly stating what the bonus rate was.  It is difficult to understand the importance of this 
category without seeing the messages in context.  When a manager specifically refers to the 
bonus rate it is almost always to make some point other than what the bonus is.  For example, 
consider the following message which was coded under category 10: “Thanks.  I appreciate 
it.  Now I'll raise it to 11.”  The employees have just raised their minimum effort from 20 to 
30.  The manager is responding by raising the bonus rate from 10 to 11.  The implication is 
clear – the manager is rewarding the employees for their increased effort.  As is almost 
always the case for messages coded under category 10, it is implied that a bonus rate of 11 is 
good pay.  Looking at the broader sweep of this particular manager’s messages, it is also 
clear that he is signaling that an increase to a minimum effort of 40 will bring a further 
increase in the bonus rate.  Indeed, he eventually succeeded in getting his employees to 
coordinate at effort level 40 in exchange for a bonus rate of 12.  This is a good example of the 
implicit references to reciprocity that appears in many messages coded under category 10. 
Turning to the employee categories, category 2 is coded when the employees indicate 
agreement to a plan, usually one coded under category 6 for the managers.  For example, an 
employee responds “Sounds good to me.  [Y]ou earn more, we earn more and everyone's 
happy” following a (lengthy) proposal by the manager that the bonus rate alternate between 8 
and 15 while the all employees choose effort level 40 in all rounds.   
Category 4 was coded for messages where an employee offered advice to a manager.  
Sometimes this advice is clearly self-serving as in the following quote: “[L]ets keep the min 
bonus at 8.... 6 is the just the LOWEST... you dont want your employees thinking theyre are 
the lowest, do you?!”  In other cases the advice is genuinely intended to help the manager 
move the group to a higher minimum effort.  For example, consider the following message 
from an employee that was coded under category 4, “Give us more concrete information: ie.  
If u all do 30, ill put a bonus of 11 the next round, then if u all do 40, till put a bonus of 12 
and then if u keep it constant I will continue to raise the bonus.”  The manager receiving the 
preceding message had been making vague promises of a higher bonus in exchange for more 
work (coded under category 5), a tactic that wasn’t working as the minimum effort was 0 in 
the round this message was sent.  The manager in the next round somewhat followed this 
advice, sending, “30 or higher and i will raise it to 10 and so on.”  This didn’t work 
immediately, as the minimum effort stayed at zero, but in later rounds the manager repeated 
 19
similar messages and was able to eventually reach perfect coordination at effort level 40.  
Sometimes the advice offered to managers is quite simple, like the following plea by an 
employee faced with an unsuccessful manager who was doing nothing but setting bonus 
rates: “Send us some messages.....”19 
Before analyzing the effects of the frequently coded categories, it is worth noting 
some of the categories that don’t appear frequently.  Manager categories 12 – 14 and 
employee categories 10 – 12 code for explicit references to fairness, trust, and reciprocity.20  
To our surprise, none of these categories are coded with any frequency.  This doesn’t imply 
that fairness, trust, and reciprocity don’t matter in this setting.  As noted previously in our 
discussion of category 10 (emphasizing the bonus rate) managers frequently refer implicitly 
to these concepts.  It may simply be that notions like trust and reciprocity are so deeply 
ingrained in our subjects that they don’t feel the need to explicitly lay them out.   
Several of the categories code for confusion about the instructions or 
misunderstanding the rules (manager categories 16, 17, and 21; employee categories 13 and 
15).  All of these categories are rare, giving us some confidence that the subjects understood 
the experimental instructions. 
A first basic question to answer about the frequently coded categories is when (and 
where) they were used.  Table 7 shows how the likelihoods of coding the most frequently 
used messages relate to a number of variables.  Specifically, we report averages over 
observations where either coder checked off the relevant category.  As a point of comparison, 
the first two rows of the table provide these same statistics for all observations with 
communication and for all observations from the two-way communication treatment.  We 
also report the results of statistical tests for whether the frequency of a category was 
significantly different in Cleveland (US) than in Barcelona (Spain) and, where relevant, 
significantly different with two-way communication.21  It should be clear that the likelihood 
of the various categories isn’t random.  As a trivial example, positive comments are generally 
associated with a high lagged minimum effort while negative comments usually follow a 
                                                          
19 In the round this message was sent, the manager select a bonus rate of 11 but still received a minimum effort 
of 0.  Subsequently the manager did start sending messages and was able to achieve higher minimum efforts 
although never reaching perfect coordination at effort level 40. 
20 We did not require that a message explicitly include one of these three words to be coded, but instead looked 
for clear references to these concepts. 
21 Statistical significance is derived from ordered probit regressions over all observations where the coding in 
question could possibly have been observed.  The regressions control for lagged minimum effort, change in 
lagged minimum effort, minimum effort in Round 10, current bonus (employee codes only), lagged bonus, and 
late rounds (rounds 21 - 30).  Standard errors are corrected for clustering 
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round with low minimum effort.  Another notable case is manager category 6, laying out long 
term plans, which is normally associated with groups that have already achieved a relatively 
high minimum effort. 
(Insert Table 7) 
Table 7 shows significant differences in the types of communication used by 
managers in Cleveland and in Barcelona consistent with our conjecture that poorer 
performance in Barcelona was linked to differences in communication style.  The most 
noticeable difference when the dialogues are read is the greater negativity of Barcelonan 
managers, as captured by the greater frequency of codings for category 2 (negative responses) 
and the lower frequency of codings for category 3 (positive responses).  However, as will 
become clear below, the less frequent coding for category 10 in Barcelona (emphasizing the 
bonus rate) may be the most important difference. 
Managers generally send more messages in the two-way communication treatment, 
partially in response to messages from their employees.  Of particular importance will be the 
more frequent usages of Category 1 (particularly 1c, requests for a specific effort level) and 
Category 10. 
Just because a category of message is used frequently doesn’t necessarily mean it 
accomplishes much.  Table 8 begins our examination of what types of messages are most 
effective for raising managers’ profits.  Data is drawn from the 39 firms in the 
communication treatments with minimum effort of 0 in round 10.  These are the firms in 
greatest need of a turnaround.  The data is broken down by whether firms achieved earnings 
above our below the median for this group.22  We report statistics for all twenty rounds with 
human managers as well as for just the first five rounds (rounds 11 – 15) when most of the 
change in employees’ choices occurs.  For the four resulting cells we report the average 
bonus rate and the frequency of the most common message categories.  We also calculate “all 
coded comments” which is the sum of the average frequencies for all of the categories.  Sub-
categories are not included in this statistic to avoid double counting.  “All coded comments” 
provides a measure for how much a manager is communicating.23   
(Insert Table 8) 
                                                          
22 The median firm is grouped with the firms below the median.  For categories that could only be coded with 
two-way communication, we use the median earnings for the 20 firms in the two-way communication treatment 
that had minimum effort of 0 in round 10. 
23 In many ways this is a more accurate measure than word counts as it does not give credit for irrelevant 
communications or for being unusually verbose. 
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To begin our examination of Table 8, note that for rounds 11 – 15 the average bonus 
rates are quite similar for firms above and below the median earnings.  Whatever leads some 
firms to eventually be more profitable than others, it doesn’t appear to be differences in 
incentives.  In contrast, there are fairly obvious differences in what messages are being sent.  
Ignoring the content of messages, managers who earn more than the median earnings send 
twice as many coded messages as their less successful peers.  Greater than median earners are 
53% more likely to be coded for category 1, 81% more likely to be coded for category 4, 
more than three times as likely to be coded for category 5, more than twice as likely to be 
coded for category 6, and more than 26 times more likely to be coded for category 10!  Most 
of these differences persist if we consider the longer sweep of rounds 11 – 30. 
Based on the results reported in Table 8 it is tempting to conclude, for example, that 
emphasizing the bonus (category 10) is an important determinant of success.  However, we 
have to be quite cautious in interpreting these results as causality hasn’t been established.  
Consider category 2, the use of negative responses.  Over rounds 11 – 30, unsuccessful 
managers are 66% more likely to be coded for category 2.  Does this imply that negativity by 
managers leads to low profits?  Not really – it instead indicates that managers who are doing 
badly are more likely to say negative things.  In this particular case the true causality can be 
easily seen by looking at the statistics for rounds 11 – 15 where successful managers are 82% 
more likely to make a negative comment.  However it is generally not so simple to pin down 
causality especially when many categories are being coded simultaneously.  We therefore 
turn to a more formal statistical analysis to determine the impact of the messages on 
minimum efforts and, ultimately, manager profits. 
Table 9 reports the results of five ordered probit regressions.  The basic data set is all 
observations from rounds 11 – 30, although some of the regressions only use a subset of this 
dataset.  The dependent variable is a firm’s minimum effort for the round being observed – it 
is the categorical nature of minimum effort that leads to our use of an ordered probit model.  
Since firms appear multiple times in the data set, the standard errors are corrected for 
clustering at the firm level (see Liang and Zeger, 1986).  The critical issue here is to 
determine whether a category is associated with higher (lower) minimum effort because it 
directly causes higher (lower) minimum effort or because it is associated with higher (lower) 
lagged minimum effort which in turn causes the high (low) current minimum effort.  To 
identify causality our regressions include lagged dependent variables – the lagged minimum 
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effort and the twice-lagged minimum effort.24  Unlike usual, the use of lagged dependent 
variables does not require us to drop any data since the first data being included is from round 
11, not round 1.  We do not report the parameter estimates for the lagged dependent variables 
in Table 9 to save space, but they are always positive and statistically significant at the 1% 
level.  A version of Table 9 including all of the dependent variables is available at 
www.weatherhead.cwru.edu/djcooper.  As additional controls, the regressions also include 
treatment dummies, structured as in Table 4, a Barcelona dummy, the minimum effort in 
round 10, and a dummy for rounds 21 – 30.  We do not report the parameter estimates for any 
of these basic controls to conserve space, but it is worth noting that the estimates for the 
treatment variables, the Barcelona dummy, and the minimum effort in round 10 tend to be 
relatively small and often fail to be statistically significant.  This shouldn’t be taken as 
evidence on treatment effects or location effects, but instead reflects the presence of lagged 
dependent variables in the regressions.  The dummy for rounds 21 – 30 is always negative 
and almost always statistically significant.  Given that the regressions capture changes in 
minimum effort levels, these negative estimates reflect the ossification of employees’ choices 
over the final ten rounds. 
(Insert Table 9) 
The critical variables for the regressions on Table 9 measure what the managers and 
employees said in their messages.  For manager messages, we include the average coding 
(e.g. across the two coders) in the current round for all categories above the 7.5% frequency 
threshold.  These variables were set equal to zero for all observations where coding wasn’t 
possible and were demeaned for all observations where coding was possible.25  For the 
employee codes, the variables are based on the average lagged employee codes as the current 
round’s employee messages haven’t yet had an opportunity to affect the behavior of other 
subjects.  As above, these variables are demeaned.26 
Three additional variables control for the impact of incentives on minimum effort 
levels.  The current bonus rate and the change in the current bonus rate (current bonus rate 
                                                          
24 In round t, the lagged minimum effort is the minimum effort from round t – 1 and the twice-lagged minimum 
effort is the minimum effort from round t – 2.  We have explored a variety of alternative specifications for the 
lagged dependent variables (e.g. longer lags or using dummies for each effort level) and found little impact on 
the qualitative results. 
25 Observations from the four firms in the one-way communication treatment for which messages weren’t saved 
are included in the set of observations for which coding isn’t possible.  As an alternative approach to handling 
these observations we have dropped them from the dataset.  This has little impact on the results. 
26 Round 11 data are included in the set of observations for which coding isn’t possible.  For the one regression 
that didn’t include managers’ categories we deleted data from Round 11. 
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minus lagged bonus rate) are included as separate variables.  These two variables capture 
different ways in which incentives might matter.  If the bonus rate only affects employee 
choices by changing the game they play among themselves, then we would expect only the 
current bonus rate to be significant.  However, if changing the bonus rate serves as an 
important mechanism for rewarding employees and encouraging positive reciprocity, then the 
change in the bonus rate should also have a positive and significant parameter estimate.  We 
also include the bonus rate in round 11 as a variable.  Given the results of our earlier tobit 
analysis, it seems likely that the first bonus rate set by a member will have a persistent effect.  
This variable was interacted with a dummy for rounds 13 – 30 and demeaned to avoid any 
interference with the estimates for “Current Bonus” and “Change in Bonus.” 
Model 1 includes controls only for managers’ messages and Model 2 only considers 
employees’ messages.  Model 3 includes all categories for both managers and employees that 
clear the 7.5% frequency hurdle.  Model 3 is the central regression in our discussion of 
message content.   
Before turning the message categories, we first consider the impact of incentives.  
While the current bonus rate in isolation does not have a significant impact on minimum 
effort levels, changes in the bonus rate do have a significant positive effect.  This suggests 
that the importance of the bonus rate does not grow from its direct effect on incentives as 
much as its utility as a mechanism for sending messages.  The preceding is consistent with 
the conclusion of Brandts and Cooper (2005) that changes in the bonus rate (in sessions with 
computer managers and full information feedback) are important more as a coordination 
device than for the direct effect on incentives.  As in the tobit analysis, we see that the bonus 
rate for round 11 has a long term positive effect, albeit of marginal statistical significance, on 
minimum effort levels.27 
REGULARITY 3:  Although the level of the bonus rate has little effect on the minimum effort, 
changes in the bonus rate lead to increases in the minimum effort.  The bonus rate set in 
round 11 has a persistent impact on minimum efforts. 
Turning to the managers’ categories, we see that categories 1 (asking for effort), 4 
(discussing the monetary benefits of higher effort), and 10 (emphasizing the bonus) have 
strong positive effects on minimum effort levels.  It is worth noting that these effects get even 
stronger if we replace category 1 with category 1c (requesting a specific effort level) and 
category 4 with category 4c (stressing mutual benefits).  Oddly, category 6 has a small but 
(marginally) statistically significant negative effect on minimum effort levels.  Category 18 
                                                          
27 Considering the effect of the round 12 bonus in an analogous regression, we fail to find any persistent impact. 
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has a large negative impact but the estimate is imprecise, leading to modest statistical 
significance.  Neither category 2 (negative responses) nor category 3 (positive responses) 
have statistically significant effects.  By extension, we do not believe that the greater 
negativity of Barcelonan managers is primarily responsible for their relatively poor 
performance.  Category 5 also fails to be statistically significant.  Although managers often 
use implicit contracts as a strategy for raising minimum effort, they apparently do little good.  
Among the employee categories, only category 4 (giving manager advice) achieves statistical 
significance.  Comparing Models 2 and 3, the strength of this effect is greatly lessened when 
the manager categories are added.  Given that employees’ advice to managers often includes 
suggestions about what messages should be sent, this weakening is to be expected.28 
In alternative versions of Models 1 and 3, not reported on Table 9, we added dummies 
for the first time a category was coded.  With one exception, these dummies are not 
statistically significant and the parameter estimates are small.  Most types of messages have 
the no greater impact the first time they are used than in later usages.  The exception is 
manager category 4.  The parameter estimate for the first time it is coded is statistically 
significant at the 5% level while the parameter estimate for its average coding becomes much 
smaller and ceases to be statistically significant.  Unlike other types of messages, category 4 
(discussing the benefits of higher effort) mainly has an effect the first time it is said.  
Presumably employees get the point and don’t need to be told a second time. 
The usefulness of some categories that have a positive effect is fairly obvious.  
Employees face a difficult coordination problem, and a good manager can help by acting as a 
coordination device.  Requesting a specific effort level and pointing out that everybody gains 
from increased minimum effort makes an increase in effort far less risky for an employee as 
he has good reason to expect that others will also increase their effort levels.  Thus, manager 
categories 1 and 4 have a strong impact on minimum effort levels.  The positive impact of 
employee category 4 is also straightforward – given that employees have a stake in the 
manager’s success, they can often help by offering good advice.   
The impact of other categories is more mysterious.  In particular, why should 
emphasizing the bonus rate (category 10) have such a strong positive impact?  After all, the 
bonus rate is already prominently displayed for employees.  In this case it is important to 
understand what is being implied, as discussed previously.  Almost always a message coded 
                                                          
28 Suppose the effect of advice is largely through getting managers to send messages that would not otherwise 
be sent.  When manager categories are included in the regression, the effect of advice will largely be absorbed 
by these variables. 
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under category 10 is meant to imply that a “good” bonus rate has been chosen. This is often 
tied implicitly to positive reciprocity – implying the bonus is a reward for high effort is 
common.  Thus, category 10 likely prompts higher effort by making employees believe there 
are large rewards for increasing effort, both in the current round and in future rounds, and by 
making them feel better about their relationship with the manager. 
It also seems strange that laying out a long run plan (category 6) has a negative 
impact.  Understanding this result becomes easier after considering Model 4.  This regression 
has all the same variables as Model 3, but the dataset only includes observations for which 
the lagged minimum effort is zero, i.e. cases where the firm is experiencing coordination 
failure.29 Category 6 now has a positive and significant parameter estimate!  Combining this 
with our detailed reading of the messages, it becomes clearer why category 6 has the effect 
that it does.  When a firm is going badly, long term plans are usually a method of building a 
good working relationship between the manager and employees.  Often the manager suggests 
a series of increases in the bonus rate in exchange for a gradual increase in effort levels.  On 
the other hand, when the firm is already doing well (in terms of high minimum effort), long 
term plans usually involve the manager trying to get a larger share of the surplus.  Not 
surprisingly, this generally doesn’t go over well with the employees. 
The negative effect of manager category 18 came as a surprise to us, as we thought 
that “soliciting feedback” from employees would be a valuable component of building a 
positive relationship.  Looking at the messages coded out under category 18, many could be 
better labeled as “requests for advice.”30  It isn’t surprising that struggling managers fail to 
generate much immediate improvement from their employees. 
Returning to Model 4, we see that it matters not just what messages are sent by a 
manager but also when they are sent.  We’ve already noted that the sign of the estimate for 
manager category 6 switches when the sample is restricted to observations with lagged 
minimum effort equal to zero.  In conjunction with this, the parameter estimate for employee 
category 2 (agreeing to manager’s plan) goes from being small and insignificant to being 
large, positive, and significant at the 1% level.  The parameter estimate for manager category 
2 (negative responses) is now negative and significant at the 1% level, while manager 
category 4 and employee category 4 cease to be statistically significant.  Manager categories 
                                                          
29 Lagged minimum effort is dropped as an independent variable for obvious reasons. 
30 e.g. “What could I do to make you work more hours on activity A?” 
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1 and 10 still receive positive and statistically significant estimates, reflecting their status as 
the most reliable paths to higher effort.31 
Thus far we have only looked at the immediate effect of the various types of message.  
Model 5 checks whether these effects are persistent – the dependent variable is the lead 
minimum effort rather than the current minimum effort.  In other words, for an observation in 
round t the dependent variable is the minimum effort in round t + 1.  All the variables are 
otherwise identical to those in Model 3.  Data from the final period is dropped since there 
isn’t a lead minimum effort.  The results of Model 5 reinforce some of our previous 
conclusions.  Not only do changes in the bonus rate and manager categories 1, 4, and 10 have 
an immediate impact on minimum efforts, they also have a persistent impact.  These 
persistent effects likely reflect both direct and indirect effects, as managers’ actions help to 
build an ongoing relationship between the manager and the employees.  Interestingly, 
category 5 now has a positive and statistically significant estimate.  This seems unlikely to be 
a direct effect, as the implicit contracts coded under category 5 are generally short-run in 
nature.  Instead it likely reflects the beginning of a positive relationship between a manager 
and his employees.  No employee category appears to have a persistent effect on minimum 
effort – the parameter estimate for employee category 4 is tiny and flips sign from Model 3. 
Calculating marginal effects on minimum effort for Models 3 and 5, even some of the 
variables that have a persistent effect lose much of their impact.32  For example, the effect of 
a bonus rate increase on the lead minimum effort is 28.4% of its effect on the current 
minimum effort.33  This declining impact likely explains why the bonus rate is significant 
here but not for the tobit analysis reported on Table 4.  In a less extreme case, the impact of 
category 1 on the lead effort is only 48.9% of its effect on the current effort level.  In contrast, 
other variables actually have a greater effect on the lead minimum effort.  Notably, the 
                                                          
31 It is important to interpret the results with some care as an ordered probit is a non-linear model.  Even though 
the parameter estimates for Categories 1 and 10 are larger in Model 4 than Model 3, the marginal effect on 
minimum effort is actually smaller for both parameters. 
32 The marginal effects are based on discrete changes.  For the bonus rate, the calculation is based on the 
difference between the mean bonus rate minus ½ and the mean plus ½.  To capture the full effect of a change in 
the bonus rate, we have re-run Model 3 with “Current Bonus” and “Lagged Bonus” as independent variables 
rather than “Current Bonus” and “Change in Bonus.”  For the various communication categories, the calculation 
is based on the change from a coding of 0 to a coding of 1.  All variables other than the one being changed are 
held fixed at their average levels.  Calculations of marginal profits, shown in Table 10, use the average bonus 
rate for the dataset. 
33 In discussing Model 3, we noted that changes in the bonus rate matter more than the level of the bonus rate.  
Given the inclusion of the lagged minimum effort, it can be argued that this result is due to most of the effect of 
the bonus rate level being captured already in the lagged dependent variable.  However, this argument relies on 
a change in the bonus rate having a persistent effect.  The results of Model 5 indicate otherwise. 
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marginal effects of categories 4, 5, and 10 on the lead minimum effort are respectively 
142.7%, 330.6%, and 128.8% of their marginal effects on the current minimum effort.  
REGULARITY 4:  The effectiveness of messages depends both on what is said and when it is 
said.  Manager messages that request greater effort (category 1) and emphasize the bonus 
rate (category 10) consistently have a positive persistent impact on minimum effort.  
Emphasizing the benefits of increased effort (category 4), proposing a long term plan 
(category 6), and employee messages that offer advice to the manager (category 4) also lead 
to increased minimum effort under certain circumstances. 
The regressions reported in Table 9 measure the impact of incentives and various 
categories of messages on minimum efforts, but do not directly address the question of how 
manager profits are affected. We have therefore calculated marginal effects on manager 
profits for Models 3 and 4 from Table 9.  (See f.n. 32 for details of how marginal effects are 
calculated.)  The results are displayed in Table 10.  The top panel shows the results for all 
data and the bottom panel limits the sample to those observations with lagged minimum 
effort of zero, the cases where the manager faces an immediate past of coordination failure.  
To give the reader some sense of the accuracy for these estimated marginal effects, we also 
recapitulate the statistical significance of the variables as reported in Table 9. 
(Insert Table 10) 
In either panel of Table 10, increasing the bonus rate has a minimal effect on profits.  
Indeed, the marginal effect across all observations is negative!  The increase in minimum 
effort caused by a bonus rate hike does not cover the additional bonuses that the manager 
must pay to employees.  Even when the firm faces an immediate past of coordination failure, 
the best case scenario for changes in the bonus rate being helpful (as the marginal effect 
cannot be negative), the impact on profits is quite small, amounting to 5.6% of average 
profits.34  In contrast, many of the message categories have large positive impacts.  Across all 
observations, categories 1, 4 and 10 increase profits by 33.0%, 18.9%, and 33.5% 
respectively.  Restricting attention to observations following a minimum effort of 0, 
categories 1, 6, and 10 increase profits by 28.0%, 36.3%, and 24.9% respectively.  Even in 
the best case for incentive payments, the marginal impact of the most effective comments is 
roughly 5 – 7 times greater than the marginal impact of a bonus rate increase.  The bottom 
line is quite clear – it’s what you say, not what you pay! 
                                                          
34 It is tempting here to argue that a bigger impact on profits can be generated by increasing the size of the bonus 
rate hike – a one unit increase at the mean is being considered here.  This argument is flawed due to the non-
linear relationship between bonus rates and profits.  For example, consider the largest possible bonus rate 
increase from B = 6 to B = 15.  Even in the case where lagged minimum effort equals zero, this cannot possibly 
lead to an increase in manager profits. 
 28
REGULARITY 5:  The manager’s communication strategy has a larger impact on his profits 
than his choice of a bonus rate. 
The marginal effects reported on Table 10 only reflect the current round; e.g. the 
round in which the bonus rate increase or message takes place.  These figures do not capture 
any long term effects on manager profits.  To the extent that some of the messages have a 
persistent impact, the true effect on profits is larger than the numbers reported here. 
6. Conclusions 
 A novel feature of our experiments is the presence of an external agent, the manager, 
who has a stake in the coordination game being played among employees.  Our goal is to 
study how such an agent might best help overcome a history of coordination failure.  The 
overarching conclusion from our analysis is that communication between managers and 
employees can play a critical role in escaping coordination failure.  More specifically, the 
effective use of communication helps our experimental firms to increase minimum effort, 
with two-way communication between human managers and employees being superior to 
one-way communication from managers to employees.  Effective communication is more 
valuable for increasing managerial profits than manipulating the employees’ bonus rate.  
There was no obvious reason to anticipate the latter result.  Facing coordination failure, it is 
in everybody’s interest for the firm to improve coordination.  We would therefore expect that 
any coordination device would serve this purpose. In addition, simple economic intuition 
suggests that financial incentives should have strong drawing power.  Although bonus rate 
increases have an overall positive effect – see also the results on incentive changes by 
computer managers reported in Brandts and Cooper (2005) – they simply don’t work as well 
as sending the right messages.  
 Not all messages between management and employees have the same beneficial 
effect.  The most effective managerial strategy seems to be rather simple and, ex post, 
natural.  Managers should request a specific effort level and emphasize the mutual benefits of 
high effort.  The goal is to act as a good coordination device.  It is useful to point out how 
well employees are being paid, although it is not important to actually pay employees 
especially well.  For employees the most effective messages give advice to the manager, 
providing the firm with benefits of more than one person thinking about his problems.  
 It may come as a surprise to many economists that effective communication is much 
more important than the choice of bonus rates.  Our interpretation of this result centers on 
how cognition enters into the achievement of coordination. Some means of achieving 
coordination may be naturally more salient than others. This kind of interplay is currently 
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terra incognito, but may be of considerable importance for understanding social and 
economic life.  In our context, the attribution of an intention to coordinate through a change 
of the bonus rate is based on a rather indirect channel.  In addition, changes in the bonus rate 
raise issues of distribution which bring a separate question into the picture and, hence, may 
increase the complexity of the situation.  Through the use of communication managers can 
directly point to the need for coordination. The exercise of cognitive leadership works better 
when leaders use cues which followers can grasp more easily. 
Although superficially the results of our experiments indicate that incentives don’t 
much matter, there actually exists a subtle interaction between incentives and 
communication.  While changing the bonus rate accomplishes little for a manager, many of 
the most effective messages appeal to the financial interests of employees.  For example, 
pointing out the mutual benefits of coordination is effective because employees care about 
coordinating and thereby earning higher payoffs.  The key to success for a manager isn’t 
making it more lucrative for employees to coordinate; rather it lies in convincing employees 
that it is in their financial interest to attempt to coordinate by raising their effort levels.  
Incentives do matter even in this setting, just not on the margin that economists are used to 
thinking about. 
 Our results have general implications for those interested in overcoming coordination 
failure.  The specific managerial strategy that works best here will not necessarily work in all 
environments, but it seems clear that one role of a good manager is to act as a good 
coordinating device.  By indicating clearly what is expected of employees35 and pointing out 
the benefits of coordinating, a good manager makes it easier for employees to overcome their 
strategic uncertainty and successfully coordinate.  More generally, a successful manager 
cannot afford to rely on increased financial incentives to generate improvement.  Good 
communication also has an important role to play.  This point is driven home by comparing 
the Cleveland and Barcelona firms, as superior performance in Cleveland is largely driven by 
differences in the communication strategies used by managers in the two locations. 
 As a final comment, we must note that our results are generated from a specific 
environment where coordination plays a central role.  We don’t argue that changing financial 
incentives will never be an effective managerial tool or that incentive design is always less 
important than communication.  There exist ample examples of environments in which 
                                                          
35 The value of clarity can also be seen in the results of Capra et al (2005), who find that “specific proposals” are 
a particular effective form of communication for increasing coordination. 
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incentives play a central role.36  An important topic for future research is determining which 
settings, such as those that involve coordination, are particularly amenable to the use of 
communication and which are more sensitive to the choice of incentives.  
                                                          
36 For an elegant example from the experimental literature on coordination games, see Battalio, Samuelson, and 
Van Huyck (2001). 
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 Table 1 
 
Employee i’s Payoff Table, B = 6 
 
  Minimum Effort by Other Employees 
  0 10 20 30 40 
 0 200 200 200 200 200 
Effort 10 150 210 210 210 210 
By 20 100 160 220 220 220 
Employee i 30 50 110 170 230 230 
 40 0 60 120 180 240 
 
 
Employee i's Payoff Table, B = 14 
       
  Minimum Effort by Other Employees 
  0 10 20 30 40 
 0 200 200 200 200 200 
Effort 10 150 290 290 290 290 
By 20 100 240 380 380 380 
Employee i 30 50 190 330 470 470 
 40 0 140 280 420 560 
 
 
Table 2 
Features of Treatments 
 
Treatment Name Computer Manager 
No 
Communication
One-way 
Communication
Two-way 
Communication
Manager Type 
Rounds 1 - 10 Computer Computer Computer Computer 
Manager Type 
Rounds 11 - 30 Computer Human Human Human 
Communication None None Managers to employees 
Managers to 
employees and 
vice versa 
Bonus Rate 
Rounds 1 – 10 6 6 6 6 
Bonus Rate 
Rounds 11 – 30 10 
Set by Manager 
in Each Round 
Set by Manager 
in Each Round 
Set by Manager 
in Each Round 
Cleveland 
Firms 5 10 20 6 
Barcelona 
Firms 5 18 7 15 
 
Table 3 
Summary of Results, Averages Over Rounds 11 – 30 
 
  Location 
Treatment Statistic Cleveland Spain Pooled 
# Firms 5 5 10 
Bonus 10 10 10 
Minimum Effort 12.1 11.4 11.8 
Manager Profit 342 328 335 
Computer 
Manager 
Employee Payoff 249 242 245 
# Firms 10 18 28 
Bonus 9.0 9.4 9.3 
Minimum Effort 5.1 3.5 4.2 
Manager Profit 214 161 183 
No 
Communication 
Employee Payoff 198 195 197 
# Firms 20 7 27 
Bonus 9.3 9.1 9.3 
Minimum Effort 15.4 4.9 12.7 
Manager Profit 431 216 376 
One Way 
Communication 
Employee Payoff 246 190 231 
# Firms 6 15 21 
Bonus 10.1 9.8 9.9 
Minimum Effort 28.0 16.9 20.1 
Manager Profit 613 379 446 
Two Way 
Communication 
Employee Payoff 326 270 238 
 
Table 4 
Tobit Regressions, Firm Averages Over Rounds 11 – 30 
Dependent Variable: Average Minimum Effort 
86 Observations, 22 Left Censored 
 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 
Constant 9.27
** 
(4.26) 
-7.05 
(18.00) 
Human managers -4.91 (4.63) 
-0.57 
(4.91) 
Communication 6.15
* 
(3.54) 
6.61* 
(3.47) 
Two Way Communication 13.69
*** 
(3.72) 
12.40*** 
(3.62) 
Barcelona -7.35
** 
(2.84) 
-7.43*** 
(2.74) 
Minimum Effort, Round 10 0.66
*** 
(0.17) 
0.73*** 
(0.17) 
Average Bonus  0.78 (0.91) 
Bonus, Round 11  1.86
** 
(0.93) 
Number of Rounds Completed  -0.52 (0.69) 
Log Likelihood -265.26 -262.31 
 
*** Significant at 1% level 
** Significant at 5% level  
* Significant at 10% level 
Summary of Manager Codings
One Way Communication Two Way Communication All Communication
1 Ask for Effort (code appropriate sub-categories as well) 0.271 0.443 0.352
1A Polite 0.067 0.044 0.056
1B Rude 0.014 0.006 0.010
1C Specific effort level 0.141 0.357 0.243
2 Negative response (code appropriate sub-categories as well) 0.080 0.115 0.097
2A Encouraging 0.014 0.023 0.018
2B Hostile 0.022 0.018 0.020
2C “Singling” our an employee 0.010 0.046 0.027
3 Positive response (praise, thanks, appreciation, etc) 0.124 0.134 0.129
4 Discuss monetary benefits of high effort (code appropriate sub-categories as well) 0.113 0.111 0.112
4A Benefits for manager 0.018 0.001 0.010
4B Benefits for employees 0.040 0.023 0.032
4C Mutual Benefits 0.059 0.086 0.072
5 Implicit Contracts (code appropriate sub-categories as well) 0.058 0.110 0.082
5A More effort today leads to higher bonus tomorrow 0.038 0.076 0.056
5B Lower effort today leads to lower bonus tomorrow 0.005 0.008 0.007
5C High bonus today, request higher effort in response 0.017 0.022 0.019
6 Laying out a plan (code appropriate sub-categories as well) 0.033 0.172 0.099
6A Alternating plan 0.011 0.084 0.045
6B Ratcheting up effort 0.003 0.033 0.017
7 Surprising employees (code appropriate sub-categories as well) 0.008 0.018 0.013
7A Choosing higher bonus than specified by plan 0.005 0.015 0.010
7B Choosing lower bonus than specified by plan 0.000 0.002 0.001
8 Encouragement (should not specifically refer to effort) 0.063 0.087 0.074
9 Use of humor 0.012 0.040 0.025
10 Emphasizing the bonus (includes explicitly stating what the bonus will be) 0.075 0.269 0.167
11 Comments about time (code appropriate sub-categories as well) 0.009 0.033 0.020
11A Need to hurry to get finished 0.001 0.027 0.013
11B Will be able to leave sooner if cooperate 0.002 0.004 0.003
12 Explicit reference to fairness 0.004 0.007 0.006
13 Explicit references to trust 0.009 0.010 0.009
14 Explicit references to reciprocity 0.004 0.004 0.004
15 Attempts by managers to appear sympathetic 0.012 0.034 0.022
16 Expressing confusion about the rules 0.000 0.008 0.004
17 Clarifying the rules 0.007 0.011 0.009
18 Soliciting feedback from employees (2-way) 0.007 0.077 0.040
19 Giving feedback to employees (2-way, involves responding to messages from employees) 0.000 0.094 0.045
20 Establishing common knowledge (2-way, passing on a message from one employee to other 0.000 0.031 0.015
21 Misunderstanding rules 0.000 0.002 0.001
Table 5
Category Description Frequency of Coding
Summary of Employee Codings
Category Description Frequency of Coding per Employee
1 Generic response to manager’s comments (code appropriate sub-categories as well) 0.207
1A Positive 0.119
1B Negative (code appropriate sub-categories as well) 0.053
1C Asking for clarification 0.008
2 Agreeing to manager’s plan 0.105
3 Disagreeing with manager’s plan 0.025
4 Giving manager advice 0.087
5 Discuss monetary benefits of high effort (code appropriate sub-categories as well) 0.017
5A Benefits for manager 0.002
5B Benefits for employees 0.000
5C Mutual Benefits 0.014
6 Implicit contracts (code appropriate sub-categories as well) 0.008
6A Higher bonus today ? more effort tomorrow 0.007
6B More effort today, request higher bonus tomorrow 0.001
7 Requesting a higher bonus 0.053
8 Attempting to start a dialogue/soliciting feedback from the manager 0.031
9 Negotiating with the manager 0.025
10 Explicit reference to fairness 0.008
11 Explicit references to trust 0.003
12 Explicit references to reciprocity 0.003
13 Rules (code appropriate sub-categories as well) 0.012
13A Expressing confusion about the rules 0.005
13B Requesting clarification of the rules 0.003
13C Clarifying the rules 0.005
14 Comments about time (code appropriate sub-categories as well) 0.017
14A Need to hurry to get finished 0.015
14B Will be able to leave sooner if cooperate 0.001
15 Misunderstanding rules 0.005
Table 6
When Are Frequently Coded Comments Likely to Be Made?
All Observations 14.91 9.52 0.50 --- 0.47 ---
All Two Way Observations 18.64 9.91 0.73 --- --- ---
Manager Category 1 15.55 9.45 0.54 0.59 *
Manager Category 1c 19.25 9.64 0.61 0.69 **
Manager Category 2 6.92 9.33 0.71 0.58
Manager Category 3 24.50 10.51 0.38 ** 0.55
Manager Category 4 11.76 9.56 0.61 0.50
Manager Category 5 14.90 9.83 0.55 0.67 ***
Manager Category 6 26.67 10.58 0.56 0.84 ***
Manager Category 10 22.52 10.25 0.43 ** 0.72 ***
Manager Category 18 23.47 10.63 0.55 --- ---
Manager Category 19 21.87 9.93 0.79 ** --- ---
Employee Category 1 19.51 9.83 0.76 ** --- ---
Employee Category 1a 20.65 10.38 0.80 *** --- ---
Employee Category 2 20.60 10.13 0.70 --- ---
Employee Category 4 16.83 9.58 0.72 --- ---
***  Significant Effect on Likelihood of Coding, 1% Level
**   Significant Effect on Likelihood of Coding, 5% Level
*    Significant Effect on Likelihood of Coding, 10% Level
Table 7
Significance
One vs. Two WayCategory
Average
Lagged Minimum
Current
Bonus Spain
Two Way
Communication
Significance
US vs. Spain
 
Table 8 
Determinants of Managerial Success 
Minimum Effort in Round 10 = 0 
 
 At or Below Median Earnings Above Median Earnings Variable 
Rounds 11 - 15 Rounds 11 - 30 Rounds 11 - 15 Rounds 11 - 30
Bonus 8.72 9.24 8.92 10.16 
All Categories .940 .911 1.879 1.836 
Category 1 .305 .280 .532 .465 
Category 1c .085 .124 .342 .385 
Category 2 .055 .126 .100 .076 
Category 3 .085 .095 .121 .166 
Category 4 .125 .089 .226 .138 
Category 5 .070 .060 .216 .106 
Category 6 .035 .034 .079 .171 
Category 10 .010 .048 .263 .289 
Category 18 .050 .029 .078 .095 
Category 19 .167 .104 .057 .088 
  
Table 9 
Ordered Probit Regressions 
 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Data Included All Data Round 11 - 30 
All Data 
Round 12 - 30 
All Data 
Round 11 - 30 
Lagged Min. 
Effort = 0 
All Data 
Round 11 - 29 
Number of 
Observations 1684 1598 1684 854 1598 
Dependent 
Variable 
Minimum 
Effort 
Minimum 
Effort 
Minimum 
Effort 
Minimum 
Effort 
Lead 
Min. Effort 
 Current Bonus .037 (.025) 
.042* 
(.024) 
.035 
(.024) 
-.048 
(.032) 
-.011 
(.026) 
Change in Bonus .109
*** 
(.030) 
.093*** 
(.028) 
.109*** 
(.029) 
.253*** 
(.034) 
.046*** 
(.022) 
Bonus, Round 11 
(Rounds 13 – 30) 
.073* 
(.039) 
.051 
(.037) 
.076* 
(.039) 
.026 
(.082) 
.051 
(.040) 
Manager  
Category 1 
.623*** 
(.147)  
.614*** 
(.144) 
.809** 
(.320) 
.253* 
(.138) 
Manager  
Category 2 
-.153 
(.240)  
-.114 
(.227) 
-1.194*** 
(.370) 
-.080 
(.243) 
Manager  
Category 3 
.146 
(.142)  
.163 
(.142) 
-.723 
(.480) 
.019 
(.204) 
Manager  
Category 4 
.379** 
(.172)  
.348** 
(.162) 
.131 
(.255) 
.409** 
(.162) 
Manager  
Category 5 
.145 
(.169)  
.139 
(.183) 
.098 
(.267) 
.372** 
(.168) 
Manager  
Category 6 
-.266 
(.174)  
-.308* 
(.167) 
.819* 
(.492) 
-.435** 
(.197) 
Manager  
Category 10 
.629*** 
(.194)  
.611*** 
(.200) 
.643** 
(.295) 
.645*** 
(.194) 
Manager  
Category 18 
-.983* 
(.581)  
-1.033* 
(.590) 
-.530 
(.590) 
-.070 
(.492) 
Manager  
Category 19 
-.609 
(.476)  
-.699 
(.474) 
-1.232 
(1.196) 
-.398 
(.417) 
Lagged Employee  
Category 1a  
.488 
(.761) 
.891 
(.736) 
-1.192 
(2.168) 
.726 
(.894) 
Lagged Employee  
Category 2  
.098 
(.626) 
-.332 
(.677) 
4.847*** 
(1.702) 
.173 
(.702) 
Lagged Employee  
Category 4  
1.397*** 
(.510) 
.980* 
(.520) 
-.071 
(.995) 
-.130 
(.430) 
Log-likelihood -1235.91 -1202.50 -1231.70 -328.72 1362.07 
 
*** Significant at 1% level  
** Significant at 5% level  
* Significant at 10% level 
 
Note:  Beyond estimates reported in this table, the regressions included controls for lagged minimum 
effort, twice lagged minimum effort, human, communication, two-way Communication, minimum 
effort in round 10, Barcelona, and a dummy for rounds 21 – 30.  A table reporting the full results is 
available from the authors on request. 
 
 
Marginal Impact on Manager Profits
All Data
1684 observations, Average current profit = 314.63
Category Description Significant Effecton Min. Effort
Marginal Effect
on Profit
N/A Bonus *** -21.53
1 Ask for Effort *** 103.68
2 Negative response -18.69
3 Positive response (praise, thanks, appreciation, etc) 27.36
4 Discuss monetary benefits of high effort ** 59.44
5 Implicit Contracts 23.34
6 Laying out a plan * -49.45
10 Emphasizing the bonus (includes explicitly stating the bonus) *** 105.50
18 Soliciting feedback from employees (2-way only) * -146.70
19 Giving feedback to employees (2-way only) -106.13
Lagged Minimum Effort = 0
854 observations, Average current profit = 140.14
Category Description Significant Effecton Min. Effort
Marginal Effect
on Profit
N/A Bonus *** 7.87
1 Ask for Effort ** 39.22
2 Negative response *** -25.07
3 Positive response (praise, thanks, appreciation, etc) -18.25
4 Discuss monetary benefits of high effort 5.48
5 Implicit Contracts 4.06
6 Laying out a plan * 50.88
10 Emphasizing the bonus (includes explicitly stating the bonus) ** 34.92
18 Soliciting feedback from employees (2-way only) -14.85
19 Giving feedback to employees (2-way only) -18.21
*** Significant Effect on Minimum Effort, 1% Level
** Significant Effect on Minimum Effort, 5% Level
* Significant Effect on Minimum Effort, 10% Level
Table 10
Figure 1
Comparison of Minimum Effort Across Treatments
All Firms
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Figure 2
Comparison of Minimum Effort Across Treatments
Firms with Coordination Failure (Minimum Effort = 0 in Round 10)
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Figure 3
Comparison of Bonuses Across Treatments, All Firms
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